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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
PlaintiflB'Appellee,
v.
Case No. 20030494-CA
THOMAS KEVIN ROTHLISBERGER,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION
UTAH CODE ANN.

§78-2a-3(2)(e) provides this Court's jurisdiction over this appeal

from the Judgment and Order ofProbation entered May 21,2003, in this case involving a
second degree felony conviction from a court of record.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS. STATEMENT OF
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL. AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE I: Did the trial court violate UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 16 in
overruling the objection by defense counsel to ChiefAdair's expert testimony?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This Court reviews the trial court's admission or
exclusion of expert testimony for an abuse of discretion. Alder v. Baver Corp.. AGFA Div..
2002 UT 115,1f20,61 P.3d 1068. Whether the trial court failed to order a requested remedy

or whether the remedy ordered was insufficient to obviate the harm resulting from a violation
under Rule 16, UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, is reviewed under an abuse-ofdiscretion standard. State v. Menzies. 889 P.2d 393,401 (Utah 1994) citinz State v. Knight.
734 P.2d 913, 918-919 (Utah 1987).
ISSUE II: Did the trial court violate UTAH CODE ANN. §77-17-13 in overruling the
objection by defense counsel to ChiefAdair's expert testimony?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This Court reviews the trial court's admission or
exclusion of expert testimony for an abuse of discretion. Alder v. Bayer Corp., AGFA Div..
2002 UT 115, f20, 61 P.3d 1068. When reviewing trial court's denial of requested
continuance in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §77-17-13 for failure to adequately disclose
expert witnesses before trial, this Court considers: (1) extent of appellant's diligence in his
or her efforts to ready his or her defense prior to the date set for trial, (2) likelihood that need
for continuance could have been met if continuance had been granted, (3) extent to which
granting continuance would have inconvenienced court and opposing party, and (4) extent
to which appellant might have suffered harm as result of court's denial. Statev.Tolano. 2001
UTApp.37,1f9,19P.3d400.
ISSUE III: Was Appellant's trial counsel ineffective in failing to request the
mandatory continuance under UTAH CODE ANN. §77-17-13?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This Court reviews ineffective assistance of counsel
claims raised for the first time on appeal as a matter of law. State v. Maestas. 1999 UT 32,
2

f20,984 P.2d 376. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that
trial counsel " 'rendered deficient performance [that] fell below an objective standard of
reasonable professional judgment* and that 'counsel's performance prejudiced' " the
defendant. Id; see also Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984).
ISSUE IV: Was the evidence sufficient to support the jury's verdict that Appellant
was guilty of Possession of a Controlled Substance With Intent to Distribute, a second degree
felony?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This court's power to review a jury verdict challenged
on grounds of insufficient evidence is limited. State v. Silva 2000 UT App 292/f 13,13 P.3d
604 (quotations and citations omitted). So long as there is some evidence, including
reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite elements of the crime can
reasonably be made, this Court's inquiry stops. State v. Mead. 2001 UT 58,Tf 67, 27 P.3d
1115 (quotations and citation omitted). This Court will reverse a jury verdict only when it
finds that the evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and
unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust. State v. Hardy. 2002
UT App 244,t 7, 54 P.3d 645 (quoting State v. Silva 2000 UT App 292, f 13, 13 P.3d 604)
(additional quotations and citations omitted).
ISSUE V: Did the trial court err in denying Appellant's motion for a directed
verdict?
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STANDARD OF REVIEW: In reviewing a trial court's rulings pertaining to a
motion for a directed verdict, this court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party and to afford him the benefit of all inferences which the evidence fairly
supports. If reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions on the issue in controversy,
a jury question exists and the motion should be denied. Depew v. Sullivan. 2003 UT App
152,141 at m. 18, citins McCloud v. Baum. 569 P.2d 1125, 1126-1127 (Utah 1977).
Issue VI: Did the trial court err in overruling defense counsel's objection to the
prosecutor's misstatement of law in his closing?
Standard of Review:

In determining whether a given statement constitutes

prosecutorial misconduct, this Court must view the statement in light of the totality of the
evidence presented at trial; further, because the trial court is in the best position to determine
the impact of a statement upon the proceedings, its rulings will not be overturned absent an
abuse of discretion. State v. Longshaw. 961 P.2d 925 (Utah App. 1998).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION,

Amend. VI and XIV

UTAH CONSTITUTION, Art. 1 § 7
UTAH CODE ANN.

§77-17-13

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 16
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE and FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 702

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 24,2002, Appellant herein, Thomas Kevin Rothlisberger (herinafter
"Rothlisberger"), was traveling as a passenger in a car driven by Tanya Althoff (hereinafter
"Althoff") returning to Moab, Utah,froma road trip they had been on to Arizona (Tr. at p.
50). Officer Eberling effectuated a traffic stop of the vehicle for improper lane travel, then
released Althoff. Id. at p. 72. Upon returning to his vehicle, Officer Eberling was informed
by dispatch that the plates on AlthofFs vehicle were expired. Id. at p. 51. Officer Eberling
effectuated a second stop approximately 1 lA blocks from the first. Id. at pp. 52, 72.
After requesting Althoff s license and registration, Officer Eberling was informed that
her driver's license was suspended (Tr. at pp. 52-53, 72, 139). He placed Althoff under
arrest and conducted a search of the vehicle incident to the arrest. Id. Eberling located a
small baggy of a white substance on the console between the twofrontseats. Id. at pp. 53,
64, 73, 98. Chief Adair (hereinafter "Adair") arrived to assist and Eberling placed
Rothlisberger under arrest for possession of methamphetamine. Id. at p. 54-55, 80, 83.
The vehicle was moved to an abandoned service station, where the two policemen
continued searching the vehicle (Tr. at pp. 55, 74,76-77, 80, 83-84). Adair located a large
bag of methamphetamine in a toilet paper roll in the passenger door and a snort bottle,
containing only residue of methamphetamine, in a pair of men's pants that was located in the
passenger door panel. Id. at pp. 56-58,60,64,74,84-86,93,97-99,100-101; Exhibits 1,5,
6 and 9. Rothlisberger claimed the pants and the snort bottle as his. Id. at p. 87. Althoff
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claimed the methamphetamine as hers and stated that Rothlisberger knew nothing about it.
Id at pp. 61,69, 71,95. Eberling found a gym bag in the back seat, which Aithoff claimed
as hers and which contained a wooden box. Id. at pp. 59, 62-63, 69, 71. The wooden box
contained scales, which had white residue on them, and several baggies. Id. at 59; Exhibits
7 and 8.
On September 26,2002, Rothlisberger was charged by Information with Possession
of a Controlled Substance With Intent to Distribute, a second degree felony; and Possession
of Drug Paraphernalia, a Class B Misdemeanor (R0001-R0002). On February 11, 2003,
Rothlisberger was found guilty of both the felony and the misdemeanor (Tr. at p. 173).
On May 5, 2003, Rothlisberger appeared for sentencing before this Court and was
sentenced to a term of one (1) to fifteen (15) years on the felony, and six (6) months on the
misdemeanor (R0115-R0117; Addendum "A"). The prison sentence was stayed and
Rothlisberger was placed on thirty-six (36) months9 probation, to include service of twelve
(12) months in the San Juan County Jail, with credit for time served. Id. On May 21,2003,
this Court entered its Judgment and Order of Probation (hereinafter the "Judgment") in this
matter. Id. On June 6, 2003, Rothlisberger filed his Notice of Appeal from the Judgment
entered with respect to this matter (R0118-R0119).
On June 16, 2003, Rothlisberger filed his Motion for Certificate of Probable Cause
and Memorandum in Support (the "First Motion") in the Seventh Judicial District Court.
On July 3, 2003, Honorable Lyle R. Anderson denied the First Motion. On July 14, 2003,
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Rothlisbergerfiledhis Motion to Set Aside Order, Rtnew Motion u- Certificate ofPr
Cause, and Strike Hearing (the "Second Motion").
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arrest. Id. at pp. 52-53, 72, 139. Eberling handcuffed Althoff and placed her in his car.
Id. at pp. 53,67, 80,139.
Rothlisberger exited the car and informed Eberling that he needed to use the bathroom
(Tr. at pp. 137-138, 140-141). Eberling accompanied Rothlisberger to the bathroom. Id.
Upon returning from the bathroom, Eberling executed a search of the vehicle, subsequent to
Althoff s arrest, and located a small baggy of a white substance on the console between the
two front seats. Id. at pp. 53, 64, 73, 98.
At that time, police chief Kent Adair (hereinafter "Adair") arrived to assist Eberling
(Tr. at p. 55, 83). Upon locating the small baggy found in the console, Eberling handcuffed
Rothlisberger and placed him under arrest for possession of methamphetamine. Id. at pp. 54,
80. Adair had Rothlisberger move the vehicle across the street to a gravel parking lot by an
old abandoned Exxon service station. Id. at pp. 55, 74, 76-77, 80, 83-84. Adair continued
searching the vehicle and located a large bag of methamphetamine in a toilet paper roll in the
passenger door and a snort bottle, containing only residue of methamphetamine, in a pair of
men's pants that was located in the passenger door panel. Id. at pp. 56-58,60,64,74, 84-86,
93,97-99,100-101; Exhibits l,5,6and9. Adair approached Rothlisberger, mirandized him
and asked him several questions. Id. at pp. 87-88. Rothlisberger admitted to Eberling and
Adair that the pants and the snort bottle were his. Id. at p. 87.
Eberling then read Althoff her Miranda rights in the back of his patrol car (Tr. at p.
61). She then informed Eberling that the crystal methamphetamine was hers and that
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Rothlisberger did not know it was there. Id. at pp. 61,69,71. Adair overheard Althoff yell
from the patrol car that Rothlisberger did not know anything about the methamphetamine.
Id. at p. 95. Althoff told Eberling that she obtained the methamphetamine from a friend in
Bluff. Id. at p. 69. In further search of the vehicle, Eberling found a gym bag in the back
seat, which Althoff claimed as hers and which contained a wooden box. Id. at pp. 59,62-63,
69, 71. The wooden box contained scales, which had white residue on them, and several
baggies. Id. at 59; Exhibits 7 and 8.
Eberling then uncuffed Althoff, had her exit the vehicle and perform field sobriety
tests (Tr.atpp. 70,78-80,131-133). She later consented to a urinalysis test. Id. at pp.61,70;
Exhibit 2. Rothlisberger admitted to having used methamphetamine that morning before they
left Arizona. Id. at p. 88. Neither Eberling nor Adair either requested or obtained a
urinalysis test of Rothlisberger. Id. at pp. 70-71.
On September 26,2002, Rothlisberger was charged by Information with Possession
of a Controlled Substance With Intent to Distribute, a second degree felony; and Possession
of Drug Paraphernalia, a Class B Misdemeanor (R0001-R0002). On February 11,2003, the
matter came for trial before a jury in the above entitled Court, at which time Rothlisberger
was found guilty of Possession of a Controlled Substance With Intent to Distribute, a second
degree felony; and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a Class B Misdemeanor (Tr. at p. 173).
On May 5, 2003, Rothlisberger appeared for sentencing before this Court and was
sentenced to a term of one (1) to fifteen (15) years on the felony, and six (6) months on the
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misdemeanor (R0115-R0117; Addendum "A"). The prison sentence was stayed and
Rothlisberger was placed on thirty-six (36) months' probation, to include service of twelve
(12) months in the San Juan County Jail, with credit for time served. Id. On May 21,2003,
this Court entered its Judgment and Order o/Probation (hereinafter the "Judgment") in this
matter. Id. On June 6, 2003, Rothlisberger filed his Notice ofAppealfromthe Judgment
entered with respect to this matter (R0118-R0119).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The United States 10th Circuit Court of Appeals has determined that evidence on the
significance of the amount of drug possessed is specialized and not within the purview of a
typical juror's knowledge, thereby requiring an "expert" to testify to provide the jurors with
the knowledge necessary to the understanding. U.S. v. Muldrow. 19 F.3d 1332, 1338
(C.A.10 (Kan.),1994) citing United States v. McDonald. 933 F.2d 1519 (10th Cir.), cert,
denied, 502 U.S. 897, 112 S.Ct. 270, 116 L.Ed.2d 222 (1991)("[a] person possessing no
knowledge of the drug world would find the importance of [the amount possessed]
impossible to understand...[t]he average juror would not know whether this quantity is amere
trace, or sufficient to pollute 1,000 people.").
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

\ 6(a)(5) states that "...the prosecutor shall

disclose to the defense upon request.. .any other item of evidence which the court determines
on good cause shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the defendant
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to adequately prepare his defense." UTAHRULESOFCRIMINALPROCEDURE 16(g) establishes
the following:
If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention
of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court may order
such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or
prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such
other order as it deems just under the circumstances.
Utah courts have held that, under UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 16, undisclosed
expert testimony is properly excluded where expert witnesses or their testimonies are not
disclosed by a certain date before trial to allow opposing parties to prepare for trial by
deposing witnesses, planning for effective cross-examination, and obtaining rebuttal
testimony. See, Turner v. Nelson. 872 P.2d 1021, 1023-1024 (Utah 1994)(upholding
exclusion of undisclosed rebuttal witness called to testify to reasonably anticipated defense);
Hardy v. Hardv, 776 P.2d 917,925 (Utah App. 1989) (excluding expert's evidence because
not timely provided to opposing party).
UTAH CODE ANN.

§77-17-13, in relevant part, states as follows:

(1) (a) If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any expert to testify in
a felony case at trial or any hearing, excluding a preliminary hearing held
pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the party
intending to call the expert shall give notice to the opposing party as soon as
practicable but not less than 30 days before trial or ten days before the hearing,
(b) Notice shall include the name and address of the expert, the expert's
curriculum vitae, and one of the following:
(i) a copy of the expert's report, if one exists; or
(ii) a written explanation of the expert's proposed testimony sufficient to give
the opposing party adequate notice to prepare to meet the testimony; and
(iii) a notice that the expert is available to cooperatively consult with the
opposing party on reasonable notice.
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(4) (a) Ifthe defendant or the prosecution fails to substantially comply with the
requirements of this section, the opposing party shall, if necessary to prevent
substantial prejudice, be entitled to a continuance of the trial or hearing
sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony.
Upon a finding that a party failed to comply with the thirty day notice requirement of UTAH
CODE ANN.

§77-17-13(l)(a), subsection 4(a) requires the trial court to grant a continuance

sufficient to prepare the meet the testimony. State v. Arellano. 964 P.2d 1167, 1170 (Utah
App. 1998).
The trial court erred by first not recognizing Adair as an expert, then by allowing
Adair to testify as to the significance of the amount of drugs possessed and the uses of the
drug paraphernalia found in the vehicle. This was in violation of both UTAH RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

16 and UTAH CODE ANN. §77-17-13 since Adair's testimony

regarding these matters was never disclosed by the State and Adair was never designated as
an expert witness.
This Court will reverse a jury verdict only when it finds that the evidence to support
the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict
plainly unreasonable and unjust. State v. Hardy, 2002 UT App 244,1 7,54 P.3d 645 (quoting
Silva 2000 UT App 292 at f 13) (additional quotations and citations omitted). In
challenging a denial of a motion for a directed verdict, parties are required to marshal all of
the evidence in favor of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient
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when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict/1 Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.. 817
P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991).
Rothlisberger was present in the vehicle where the drugs were found; however, a
defendant's "mere occupancy of a portion of the premises where the drug[s were] found
cannot, without more, support a finding" that defendant knowingly and intentionally
possessed a controlled substance. State v. Hansen. 732 P.2d 127,132 (Utah 1987). However,
constructive possession may be established through circumstantial evidence. See, State v.
Carlson. 635 P.2d 72, 74 (Utah 1981). A finding of constructive possession of controlled
substances in nonexclusive occupancy settings generally is based on extensive and detailed
factual evidence. See, State v. Anderton. 668 P.2d 1258,1264 (Utah 1983). Circumstantial
evidence presented must sufficiently exclude reasonable alternative hypotheses of innocence.
State v. Lavman. 953 P.2d 782, 790 (Utah App. 1998); Cf State v. Shipp. 216 N.J.Super.
662, 524 A.2d 864, 866 (App.Div.1987)
Rothlisberger admitted to having used drugs earlier that day; however, this Court has
previously determined that drug use does not, in and of itself, conclude that a defendant had
access to and control over the drugs, even when the defendant is under the influence when
investigated by police officer. State v. Lavman. 953 P.2d 782,791 (UtahApp. 1998). Where
consumption of a drug occurred at some prior point in the day, that evidence in and of itself
does not sufficiently show that the person had "access to or control over" the drugs found by
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police. Id. The State must have proven "mutual use and enjoyment" to support a "an
inference ofjoint participation in a criminal enterprise." Id.
No evidence was presented that Rothlisberger had actual knowledge of the location
of any drugs in the vehicle, but he was convicted of both possession and possession with
intent to distribute. Actual knowledge of the location of drugs in the vehicle a person is
traveling in, with no intent to use the drugs, cannot stand to convict a person for possession.
See State v. Fox. 709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985) ("[P]ersons who might know of the
whereabouts of illicit drugs and who might even have access to them, but who have no intent
to obtain and use the drugs cannot be convicted of possession."); Shipp, 524 A.2d at 866
("[M]ere knowledge, without more, on the part of one automobile passenger that a copassenger is carrying illicit drugs does not constitute the former a co-possessor.").
The jury had to indulge in inference upon inference, or inference upon assumption to
convict Rothlisberger of possession or possession with intent to distribute. This Court has
cautioned courts to take special care to ensure that their review of the evidence does not
encourage the indulging of "inference upon inference," or, worse, the indulging of inference
upon assumption. State v. Lavman. 953 P.2d 782, 791 (Utah App.,1998) citing State v.
George. 481 P.2d 667 (Utah 1971) (finding "no evidence as to whether the defendants ...
took the truck and camper, save by way of inference ... and we believe that under the facts
of this particular case, the jury had to indulge an inference upon an inference that could lead
but to conjecture").
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The State carries the burden in criminal cases of proving each element of the charged
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In cases relying on constructive possession, that burden
entails a presentation of extensive and detailed facts. Layman citing Anderton. 668 P.2d at
1263. As argued below, the facts in this case were lacking. Although the jury may reject
Althoff s testimony as not credible, this Court has stated that it cannot substitute its belief as
to the truth of evidence not in the record. State v. Lavman. 953 P.2d 782, 790 (Utah
App.,1998).
The prosecutor misstated the law in his closing arguments. In determining whether
a given statement constitutes prosecutorial misconduct, this Court must view the statement
in light of the totality of the evidence presented at trial; further, because the trial court is in
the best position to determine the impact of a statement upon the proceedings, its rulings will
not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Longshaw, 961 P.2d 925 (Utah
App. 1998). This Court has enunciated a two-part test whereby it will reverse on the basis
of prosecutorial misconduct only if defendant shows that [1] "the actions or remarks of
[prosecuting] counsel call to the attention of the jury a matter it would not be justified in
considering in determining its verdict and, if so, [2] under the circumstances of the particular
case, whether the error is substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood
that, in its absence, there would have been a more favorable result...." Id. at 928, citing State
v. Cummins. 839 P.2d 848,852 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting State v. Peters. 796 P.2d 708,712
(Utah App.1990)), cert denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993).
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ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING
THE OBJECTION BY DEFENSE COUNSEL TO
CHIEF ADAIR'S EXPERT TESTIMONY
A,

The Testimony Given by Chief Adair Was Expert Testimony under UTAH
RULES OF EVIDENCE 702.

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE

701 states as follows:

If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the
form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which
are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a
clear understanding of the witness1 testimony or the determination of a fact in
issue.
(emphasis added).

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 702, however,

sets forth that "[i]f scientific,

technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise"(emphasis added). The United States 10th Circuit Court ofAppeals has determined
that evidence on the significance of the amount of drug possessed is specialized and not
within the purview of a typical juror's knowledge, thereby requiring an "expert" to testify to
provide the jurors with the knowledge necessary to the understanding. U.S. v. Muldrow, 19
F.3d 1332, 1338 (C.A.10 (Kan.), 1994) citing United States v. McDonald, 933 F.2d 1519
(10th Cir.), cert denied, 502 U.S. 897, 112 S.Ct. 270, 116 L.Ed.2d 222 (1991)("[a] person
possessing no knowledge of the drug world would find the importance of [the amount
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possessed] impossible to understand...[t]he average juror would not know whether this
quantity is a mere trace, or sufficient to pollute 1,000 people.").
In United States v. McDonald, the trial court never formally accepted the police
officer as an expert witness, but the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals assumed the witness was
accepted as an expert witness by the trial court since the trial court heard the witness describe
his qualifications, including his specialized knowledge, education, skills and experience, and
then allowed the witness to give opinion testimony. McDonald at 1522, fh. 2; see also UTAH
RULES OF EVIDENCE 702. At trial, the trial court in the instant matter never formally accepted
Adair as an expert witness with respect to methamphetamine distribution and paraphernalia,
stating only that he was testifying as a lay witness pursuant to Rule 701 of the UTAH RULES
OF EVIDENCE (Tr.

at p. 105). In the trial court's ruling on the Second Motion, however, the

trial court acknowledged that it had accepted Adair as a lay witness at the trial but that, upon
review for the Second Motion, determined that the testimony was ".. .neither expert testimony
or [sic] lay opinion testimony, but merely testimony about Adair's actual experience"
(R0211-R0213; emphasis added).
Adair's testimony was not the type of attestation a lay person could render. See,
McDonald. The prosecutor even premised some of his questions by asking Adair to render
an opinion "...through [his] training and experience..." as to what the typical distributional
amount of methamphetamine was on the street and the uses of certain drug paraphernalia (Tr.
at pp. 91-92; emphasis added). Additionally, the trial court had heard Adair describe his
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qualifications, including his specialized knowledge, education, skill and experience with
respect to drug distribution and paraphernalia (Tr. at pp. 81 -83). Specifically, Adair testified
as follows:
BY MR. HALLS:
Q.
State your name and occupation.
A.
My name is Kent Adair, and I'm a police officer for Monticello City.
Q.
How long have you been a police officer?
A.
Twentyyears.
Q.
What kind of training did you have before you became a police officer?
A.
I went to the police academy.
Q.
Have you taken or had some training in drug intervention, (inaudible) drugs,
that kind of thing?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Has it required that you keep up some kind of a certification by taking
seminars on a yearly basis?
A.
We have to have 40 hours annual training.
Q.
Have you done that?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Is that for the last 20 years?
A.
Yes.
Q.
How many drug cases do you think you have worked in that 20 years?
A.
I don't know.
Q.
So-A.
Myself or been involved in?
Q.
Okay, let's go with been involved in. Give me [sic] estimate, if you can.
A.
I don't know, I'd say a hundred, probably.
Q.
Do you supervise anyone in your department that works with the Grand San
Juan County Drug Task Force?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Have you been involved in cases that involve methamphetamine?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Are you familiar or do you know from your training and experience — well,
I'm going to wait a few minutes to ask you that...
Id Based on this information concerning Adair's specialized knowledge, education, skills
and experience, the trial court allowed Adair to testify as to the significance of the amount
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possessed, hence it is assumed Adair was accepted as an expert witness by the trial court.
McDonald at 1522, fh. 2.
As discussed further below, under objection from the defense and in violation of
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

16 and UTAH CODE ANN. §77-17-13, Adair testified

as an undisclosed expert to the amount of methamphetamine considered to be a single dose
and the uses of the drug paraphernalia found in the vehicle (Tr. at pp. 86-87, 90-92).
B.

The State Violated UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 16 and UTAH
CODE ANN. §77-17-13, by Failing to Disclose Chief Adair's Testimony to
the Defense.
(1)

Adair's expert testimony should have been excluded pursuant to UTAH
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 16.

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

16(a)(5) states that "...the prosecutor shall

disclose to the defense upon request.. .any other item of evidence which the court determines
on good cause shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the defendant
to adequately prepare his defense." UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 16(g) establishes
the following:
If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention
of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court may order
such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or
prohibit the partyfromintroducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such
other order as it deems just under the circumstances.
Utah courts have held that, under UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 16, undisclosed
expert testimony is properly excluded where expert witnesses or their testimonies are not
disclosed by a certain date before trial to allow opposing parties to prepare for trial by
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deposing witnesses, planning for effective cross-examination, and obtaining rebuttal
testimony. See, Turner v. Nelson. 872 P.2d 1021, 1023-1024 (Utah 1994)(upholding
exclusion of undisclosed rebuttal witness called to testify to reasonably anticipated defense);
Hardv v.Hardy, 776 P.2d 917,925 (Utah App. 1989) (excluding expert's evidence because
not timely provided to opposing party).
Where evidence is inculpatory, the prosecutor's discovery duty is limited to
disclosures under Rule 16 of the UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. Statev.Rugebregt.
965 P.2d 518, 522 (Utah App. 1998). Whether prosecutors produce inculpatory evidence
under court order or upon request, they have a duty to comply fully and forthrightly. Id. The
Utah Supreme Court has held that, when the prosecution makes a voluntary disclosure of
inculpatory evidence to a defendant, the prosecution must produce all the requested material
or identify those portions not disclosed. State v. Knight 734 P.2d 913,916-17 (Utah 1987).
In cases involving wrongful failure to disclose inculpatory evidence, the State has the burden
of persuading the court that the error did not unfairly prejudice Appellant and there was no
reasonable likelihood that, absent the error, the outcome of the trial would have been more
favorable for Appellant. Id. at 921.
At the trial in this matter, Appellant's trial counsel objected to Adair's testimony with
respect to drug distribution amounts and paraphernalia (R0104-RO108). As established supra,
Adair testified as an expert with respect to drug distribution amounts and paraphernalia;
however, his expert testimony was not disclosed by the prosecution prior to the trial in this
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matter. Adair's testimony was inculpatory and, therefore, the prosecutor had a duty to
disclose it fully and forthrightly to the defense under Rule 16. State v. Rugebregt 965 P.2d
518, 522 (Utah App. 1998).
The State voluntarily disclosed to the defense that Adair would be called as a witness,
designating him only as "Law Enforcement, assisting officer" on the witness list (R0028);
however, the State failed to produce all of the evidence when it failed to disclose that Adair
would be testifying as an expert in drug distribution and paraphernalia. See, Knight at 91617.
The State's failure to disclose Adair's expert testimony to the defense prior to the trial
in this matter denied Appellant the ability to plan for an effective cross-examination and
obtain rebuttal testimony with respect to Adair. The failure to disclose Adair's testimony as
to the amount of methamphetamine per dose and the uses of the drug paraphernalia found
in the vehicle was clearly a violation of Rule 16 of the
PROCEDURE.

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL

Given the fact that the State was charging Appellant with intent to distribute

and Adair's expert testimony went directly towards that end, the State's violation of Rule 16
was prejudicial to Appellant.
(2)

§77-17-13 mandates that Appellant, at a minimumwas entitled to a continuance to prepare for the undisclosed expert
testimony.
UTAH CODE ANN.

(a)

ROTHLISBERGER'S TRIAL COUNSEL WAS
INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO PRESERVE THE ISSUE.
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The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "ineffective assistance of trial counsel
[claims] should'be raised on appeal if the trial record is adequate to permit decision of the
issue and defendant is represented by counsel other than trial counsel." State v. Strain. 885
P.2d 810, 814 (Utah App. 1994) citing State v. Humphries. 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah
1991)(emphasis added). As is shown below, the trial record is adequate as to the issues
Appellant raises respecting ineffective assistance, and counsel herein was not Appellant's
trial counsel for this matter.
To show ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant "must establish both prongs
of the two-part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052
(1984):(1) that his counsel's performance 'fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness,' id. at 688,104 S.Ct. at 2064; and (2) that counsel's performance prejudiced
the defendant Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064." State v. Strain. 885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah
App. 1994). An ineffective assistance claim can Msucceed[ ] only when no conceivable
legitimate tactic or strategy can be surmisedfromcounsel's actions." State v. Perry, 899 P.2d
1232, 1241 (Utah App. 1995) (citation and quotations omitted).
The remedy for failure to provide notice of expert testimony under UTAH CODE ANN.
§77-17-13 is a continuance. State v. Arellano, 964 P.2d 1167 (Utah App. 1998), 347 Utah
Adv. Rep. at 15-16; State v. Larson. 775 P.2d 415,418 (Utah 1989). The plain language of
§77-17-13(4)(a) says the defendant is "entitled" to a continuance, and this Court has
determined that it is contingent on the defendant seeking or claiming one. State v. Perez.
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2002 UT App. 211, f l l , 52 P.3d 45L Rothlisberger's trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance of counsel in this regard.
Rothlisberger's trial counsel failed to request a continuance to which he was entitled
under the plain language of UTAH CODE ANN. §77-17-13(4)(a). In the absence of a request
for a continuance from his trial counsel, the trial court had no duty to order a continuance.
State v. Perez. 52 P.3d 451 (Utah App.,2002). Rothlisberger's trial counsel's performance
in this area fell below an objective standard of reasonableness in that she failed to exhaust
all remedies available to avoid proceeding unprepared with an undisclosed expert witness.
Given the fact that a continuance is statutorily mandated by UTAH

CODE ANN.

§77-17-

13(4)(a), there can be no conceivable, legitimate tactic or strategy surmised from her actions,
or lack thereof. Perry at 1241.
Rothlisberger' s trial counsel's failure to request the statutorily mandated continuance
under UTAH CODE ANN. §77-17-13(4)(a) caused a failure to preserve the issue for appeal.
State v. Hansen. 2002 UT 114,121 atfid.2,61 P.3d 1062 citing State v. Roth 2001 UT 103,
t 5 , 37 P.3d 1099. Despite Appellant's trial counsel's ineffective assistance in this regard,
Appellant believes this issue should be addressed by this Court.
(b)

UTAH CODE ANN.

ROTHLISBERGER WAS ENTITLED TO CONTINUANCE
TO PREPARE FOR THE UNDISCLOSED EXPERT
TESTIMONY OFFERED BY ADAIR.
§77-17-13, in relevant part, states as follows:

(1) (a) If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any expert to testify in
a felony case at trial or any hearing, excluding a preliminary hearing held
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pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the party
intending to call the expert shall give notice to the opposing party as soon as
practicable but not less than 30 days before trial or ten days before the hearing,
(b) Notice shall include the name and address of the expert, the expert's
curriculum vitae, and one of the following:
(i) a copy of the expert's report, if one exists; or
(ii) a written explanation of the expert's proposed testimony sufficient to give
the opposing party adequate notice to prepare to meet the testimony; and
(iii) a notice that the expert is available to cooperatively consult with the
opposing party on reasonable notice.
(4) (a) If the defendant or the prosecution fails to substantially comply
with the requirements of this section, the opposing party shall, if
necessary to prevent substantial prejudice, be entitled to a continuance of
the trial or hearing sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony.
(emphasis added). Upon a finding that a party failed to comply with the thirty day notice
requirement of UTAH CODE ANN. §77-17-13(1 )(a), subsection 4(a) requires the trial court to
grant a continuance sufficient to prepare the meet the testimony. State v. Arellano. 964 P.2d
1167, 1170 (Utah App. 1998).
As argued supra, Appellant's trial counsel was ineffective as it pertains to preserving
this issue for appeal, thus failing to afford the trial court an opportunity to determine the
matter. However, Appellant assumes the trial court would have denied a motion for
continuance under UTAH CODE ANN. §77-17-13 since it found Adair's testimony to be that
of a lay person under UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 701, rather than an expert under Rule 702.
Without designating Adair as an "expert" at trial, it is reasonable to believe that the trial court
would not have entertained an objection based upon §77-17-13, which is specifically titled
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"Expert Testimony, generally—Notice Requirements." Thus, Appellant addresses the issue
under the presupposition of a trial court denial of a continuance.
In reviewing a denial of a request for a continuance for a §77-17-13 notice violation,
this Court considers four factors, as follows:
(1) the extent of appellant's diligence in his efforts to ready his defense prior
to the date set for trial; (2) the likelihood that the need for a continuance could
have been met if the continuance [was] granted; (3) the extent to which
granting the continuance would...inconvenience[] the court and the opposing
party; and (4) the extent to which the appellant might...suffer[] harm as a result
of [the denial of a continuance].
State v. Tolano. 2001 Ut App. 37,19, 19 P.3d 400 citing State v. Arellano. 964 P.2d 1167,
1170 (Utah App. 1998); State v. Besishe. 937 P.2d 527, 530 (Utah App. 1997). It is clear
that each of these four factors was met in the instant case. First, Appellant exercised
diligence in his efforts to prepare his defense prior to the date set for trial. Appellant's trial
counsel appeared, was adequately prepared to proceed with trial, and extensively crossexamined the prosecution's witnesses to the best of her ability1.
Second, the need for a continuance could have been met had Appellant's trial counsel
requested one and had the trial court granted one. Appellant's trial counsel did object to
Adair's testimony, asking that the trial court exclude it. Because Adair's testimony was

1

This statement, of course, is not intended to preclude Appellant's prior argument
that trial counsel was not afforded the time to prepare for Adair's testimony, and it should
not be assumed to do so. Without notification, Appellant's trial counsel was obviously
not able to adequately cross-examine Adair on the issues argued supra.
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undisclosed by the prosecution, Appellant's trial counsel was unprepared to rebut it. Had a
continuance been granted, Appellant's trial counsel could have obtained the curriculum vitae
and a written explanation of Adair's proposed testimony, enabling her to prepare a proper
defense on Appellant's behalf. See, UTAH CODE ANN. §77-17-13(b)(ii).
Third, any inconvenience to the court and the prosecution has been specifically held
by this Court to be outweighed by Appellant's right to a fair trial. State v. Arellano. 964 P.2d
1167, 1170 (Utah App. 1998) citing Begishe at 531. Fourth, the extent to which Appellant
might have suffered harm is the most important among the factors and, in Arellano, this
Court shifted the burden to the State to show that the error did not unfairly prejudice
Appellant. See, Tolano at f 14; State v. Knight 734 P.2d 913, 920-921 (Utah 1987). This
case clearly met the Tolano factors and a continuance would have been sufficient to correct
the error.
(3)

The failure to disclose Adair's testimony was prejudicial to Appellant.

Adair's testimony was relied upon heavily in the decision handed down by the jury;
to wit, Possession of a Controlled Substance With Intent to Distribute, a second degree
felony. Adair testified to the significance of the amount of methamphetamine and the drug
paraphernalia found in the vehicle, both of which direct a jury to the conclusions drawn in
this matter. Adair was not disclosed as an expert to defense counsels, and should not have
been allowed to testify as an expert at the trial without allowing the defense time to prepare
for the testimony. His testimony was prejudicial to Rothlisberger and was a clear violation
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of Rule 16 of the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE and
Rothlisberger's right to a fair trial was violated.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§77-17-13.

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, Amends.

VI and XIV; CONSTITUTION OF UTAH Art. I §§ 7 and 12. The only remedy for this violation
at this stage is reversal of the Judgment entered May 21,2003. See, State v. Begishe. 937
P.2d 537 (Utah App. 1997).
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION
FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT
This court's power to review a jury verdict challenged on grounds of insufficient
evidence is limited. State v. Silva 2000 UT App 292,f 13, 13 P.3d 604 (quotations and
citations omitted). So long as there is some evidence, including reasonable inferences, from
which findings of all the requisite elements of the crime can reasonably be made, this Court's
inquiry stops. State v. Mead. 2001 UT 58,1 67, 27 P.3d 1115 (quotations and citation
omitted). This Court will reverse a jury verdict only when it finds that the evidence to
support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the
verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust. State v. Hardv. 2002 UT App 244,117,54 P.3d 645
(quoting State v. Silva 2000 UT App 292,1fl3, 13 P.3d 604) (additional quotations and
citations omitted).
In challenging a denial of a motion for a directed verdict, parties are required to
marshal all of the evidence in favor of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is
insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." Crookston v. Fire Ins.
27

Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991). In reviewing a trial court's rulings pertaining to a
motion for a directed verdict, this court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party and to afford him the benefit of all inferences which the evidence fairly
supports. Ifreasonable persons could reach differing conclusions on the issue in controversy,
a jury question exists and the motion should be denied. Depew v. Sullivan, 2003 UT App
152, Tf41 at fh. 18, citing McCloud v. Baum. 569 P.2d 1125, 1126-1127 (Utah 1977).
A.

Marshaling of the Evidence.

On September 24,2000, Appellant was a passenger in a vehicle driven by Althoff (Tr.
at p. 50). Althoff was pulled over by Eberling twice; first, when the vehicle touched the
center dotted line, crossed outside the fog line, came back into the travel lane, then pulled off
the road without signaling and stopped; and second, when Eberling received information that
the vehicle's plates had expired (Tr. at pp. 50-52, 74-75). Subsequent to the second stop,
Eberling received information that Althoff s driver's license was suspended, so he
handcuffed her and placed her under arrest for driving on a suspended license (Tr. at pp. 5253, 66, 72, 80). Althoff was placed in the back seat of Eberling's patrol car (Tr. at p. 83).
Eberling asked Appellant to step out of the vehicle so he could search the vehicle
incident to the arrest (Tr. at p. 53). Appellant complied and exited the vehicle and went
around to the front of the car (Tr. at p. 68). Upon initial search of the vehicle, Eberling found
a small baggie containing a white substance he believed to be methamphetamine on the
console between the driver and passenger seat. Id., Tr. at p. 73; Exhibit" 1" at p. 5. Eberling
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testified that he handcuffed and placed Appellant under arrest and then called Chief Adair
to come and assist (Tr. at pp. 54-55, 80, 83). Adair testified that he believed Eberling found
the small baggie while he was there (Tr. at p. 98). Adair also testified that, when he arrived,
Appellant was on the pay phone and was not handcuffed and Adair did not know that
Eberling had placed Appellant under arrest (Tr. at p. 83, 94, 95).
Upon arriving, Adair accompanied Appellant while Appellant drove the vehicle across
the street to an abandoned station so the officers could continue searching it (Tr. at p. 55,74,
76, 83-84). When Adair tried to get in the vehicle to accompany Appellant, he noticed the
passenger side door did not have a panel and a pair of men's levi's were stuffed in the open
frame. Id. The pants were in the way, so Appellant told Adair he could take them out of the
door frame to get them out of the way (Tr. at p. 97). Althoff at some point told Adair that
she had put the pants there because it was cold. Id.
After moving Althoff s vehicle across the street, Adair went to get his patrol car (Tr.
at p. 84,96). On his way back in his patrol car, Adair observed Appellant acting nervous and
trying to look in the back window of the car to see what Eberling was doing (Tr. at p. 85,96).
Eberling was searching in the car on the passenger front seat. Id. Adair directed Appellant
to sit down and told Eberling to look in thefrontpassenger seat. Id.
Upon further searching of the vehicle, Adair then located a toilet paper roll with a bag
containing 210 milligrams of methamphetamine in the passenger side door frame of the
vehicle (Tr. at p. 56,65,74,85,98-99; Exhibit "1M at p. 2, and Exhibits "5" and "6"). Adair
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also located a snort bottle containing methamphetamine residue inside the pocket of the
men's pants (Tr. at pp. 57,60, 62, 64, 84, 86-87, 93,100-101; Exhibit "1" at p. 2; Exhibit
"9"). Appellant informed Adair that the snort bottle was his (Tr. at p. 87). Adair then
mirandized Appellant and Appellant informed him that he had used methamphetamine that
morning (Tr. at pp. 88-89).
Eberling then located a gym bag in the back seat of the vehicle which contained a
wooden box with scales and baggies (Tr. at p. 59; Exhibits "7" and "8"). The scales
contained white residue. Id. After locating these items in the vehicle, Eberling mirandized
Althoff while she was in the back of his patrol car and Althoff informed Eberling that the
crystal methamphetamine was hers and that Appellant knew nothing about it (Tr. at p. 61,69,
71,95). Althoff claimed she obtained the drugs from a friend in Bluff (Tr. at p. 69). Althoff
also claimed ownership of the gym bag, which contained the scales and baggies (Tr. at pp.
62-63, 69, 71). Eberling conducted field sobriety tests on Althoff (Tr. at p. 70, 75-80).
Eberling directed that Althoff undergo a urinalysis test, which came back positive for
methamphetamine. Id. Eberling did not request a urinalysis test from Appellant (Tr. at pp.
70-71,76).
B.

The Circumstantial Evidence Failed to Sufficiently Exclude the
Alternative Hypothesis.

A defendant's "mere occupancy of a portion of the premises where the drug[s were]
found cannot, without more, support afinding"that defendant knowingly and intentionally
possessed a controlled substance. State v. Hansen. 732 P.2d 127,132 (Utah 1987). However,
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constructive possession may be established through circumstantial evidence. See, State v.
Carlson, 635 P.2d 72, 74 (Utah 1981). A finding of constructive possession of controlled
substances in nonexclusive occupancy settings generally is based on extensive and detailed
factual evidence. See, State v. Anderton. 668 P.2d 1258, 1264 (Utah 1983). Evidence must
be "sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime for which he was
convicted." State v. Salas. 820P.2d 1386,1387 (Utah App. 1991). Circumstantial evidence
presented must sufficiently exclude reasonable alternative hypotheses of innocence. State v.
Lavman, 953 P.2d 782, 790 (Utah App. 1998); Cf. State v. Shipp. 216 NJ.Super. 662, 524
A.2d 864, 866 (App.Div.1987) (stating "members of the same family commonly travel
together in the same automobile, and the fact that these two were together on this occasion
is no more consistent with the proposition that defendant was a participant in [his
grandmother's] criminal enterprise than that he was not.").
No evidence was presented indicating that Rothlisberger had actual possession of any
controlled substance, so this is a case of constructive possession. The circumstantial
evidence, as marshaled supra and presented at trial was sufficiently inconclusive to prove
constructive possession.
Rothlisberger was a passenger in a vehicle driven by Althoff. The larger baggie of
methamphetamine was found in a toilet paper roll in the passenger side door frame, where
Althoff had stuffed a pair of men's pants to keep the cold air from getting in the car. The

31

scales and baggies considered to be the drug paraphernalia used in distribution were found
concealed in the back seat of the car in a gym bag, which was claimed by Althoff. Appellant
appeared nervous to Adair when Eberling was searching the passenger side of the front seat.
This circumstantial evidence is no more consistent with the proposition that Appellant
planned to distribute this quantity of methamphetamine than it is that he did not. This less
than extensive and detailed evidence does not sufficiently exclude the alternative hypothesis
that Appellant (a) did not know the toilet paper roll2 or the scales and baggies3 were even in
the vehicle and (b) was nervous only because the pants which contained the snort bottle to
which Appellant claimed ownership were located in this same vicinity of the vehicle as the
toilet paper roll—namely, the front passenger side. Appellant's nervousness is just as easily
explained by the idea that he was concerned about the officers discovering the snort bottle
in that vicinity of the vehicle,
A vehicle is a nonexclusive occupancy setting where proximity cannot prove guilt
since the entire surroundings are proximal to any of its occupants. Rothlisberger' s presence
in the vehicle cannot alone support a finding that he knowingly and intentionally possessed

2

Adair testified that Rothlisberger told him to pull the pants out of the door if they
were in the way (Tr. at p. 97). If Rothlisberger had actual knowledge that the toilet paper
roll was in the door panel, he naturally would have been at least a little reluctant in
allowing Adair to remove the pants; however, Adair's testimony did not indicate any
reluctance on Rothlisberger's part.
3

It is important to reiterate that the scales and baggies were found concealed in
Althoff s gym bag in the backseat of the vehicle, and no evidence was presented
indicating that Rothlisberger had any knowledge they were there.
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a controlled substance. Hansen at 132. It is clear to see that the evidence presented was
insufficient. Based on the evidence presented at trial, a reasonable mind could easily
entertain doubt that Rothlisberger committed the crimes of possession and, particularly,
possession with intent to distribute.
C.

Appellant's admitted use of methamphetamine earlier that day cannot
support a conclusion of possession.

This Court has previously determined that drug use does not, in and of itself, conclude
that a defendant had access to and control over the drugs, even when the defendant is under
the influence when investigated by police officer. State v. Layman. 953 P.2d 782,791 (Utah
App. 1998). Where consumption of a drug occurred at some prior point in the day, that
evidence in and of itself does not sufficiently show that the person had "access to or control
over" the drugs found by police. Id. The State must have proven "mutual use and
enjoyment" to support a "an inference ofjoint participation in a criminal enterprise." Id.
Rothlisberger admitted to having used earlier that morning before leaving Arizona and
admitted that the snort bottle found in the jeans stuffed in the door was his. No evidence was
presented by the prosecution indicating that the residue in the snort bottle was the same as
that which was found in the large or small baggies in the vehicle. The State failed to prove
"mutual use and enjoyment" or any intent on behalf of Mr. Rothlisberger. His admitted use
of methamphetamine earlier in the day does not support a conclusion of possession or
possession with intent to distribute.
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D.

Actual knowledge and location in vehicle does not prove possession.

Actual knowledge of the location of drugs in the vehicle a person is traveling in, with
no intent to use the drugs, cannot stand to convict a person for possession. See State v. Fox,
709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985) (ff[P]ersons who might know of the whereabouts of illicit
drugs and who might even have access to them, but who have no intent to obtain and use the
drugs cannot be convicted of possession."); Shipp. 524 A.2d at 866 ("[M]ere knowledge,
without more, on the part of one automobile passenger that a co-passenger is carrying illicit
drugs does not constitute the former a co-possessor."); Arellanes v. United States. 302 F.2d
603, 606-07 (9th Cir.1962) (stating evidence that wife was present with husband at time
drugs were found in car and that she was probably aware of presence of drugs was not
sufficient to establish elements ofjoint venture where her presence with husband and drugs
"is as fully explained by her attachment to her husband as it might be by a control over the
drugs.").
As established above, Rothlisberger was a passenger in a vehicle driven by Althoff.
Althoff stated to police officers that Rothlisberger knew nothing about the methamphetamine
and the drug paraphernalia found in the vehicle. Even if Rothlisberger did know that Althoff
had methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia in the vehicle, the State never presented any
evidence that Rothlisberger had any intent to obtain or use the drugs. See, State v. Fox, 709
P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985) Not only did the State fail to prove that Rothlisberger had the
requisite intent, but they did not even present evidence at trial indicating that he had any
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knowledge whatsoever. Without more evidence, Rothlisberger as a co-passenger cannot
automatically be deemed a co-possessor. Shipp. 524 A.2d at 866.
E.

A jury is not allowed to indulge in inference upon inference that could
lead but to conjecture.

Where the State failed to present evidence establishing a pivotal fact-in this case, that
Rothlisberger was aware and a knowing participant in the criminal enterprise, see State v.
Fox. 709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985)-this Court has cautioned courts to take special care to
ensure that their review of the evidence does not encourage the indulging of "inference upon
inference," or, worse, the indulging of inference upon assumption. State v. Layman, 953
P.2d 782,791 (Utah App., 1998) citing State v. George. 481 P.2d 667 (Utah 1971) (finding
"no evidence as to whether the defendants ... took the truck and camper, save by way of
inference... and we believe that under the facts of this particular case, the jury had to indulge
an inference upon an inference that could lead but to conjecture"); see also State v. Franks.
649 P.2d 3, 4 (Utah 1982) (reversing jury verdict of theft after noting "[ajlthough the
elements of an offense may be established by direct or circumstantial evidence, the evidence
adduced in this case was de minimis and therefore insufficient to support a conviction" and
rejecting State's argument that "there is no evidence that the owner consented to defendant's
control of the vehicle" where "burden is on the state to show unauthorized control, not on the
defendant to show authorized control." (footnote omitted)).
Rothlisberger admitted to having used drugs earlier that day before leaving Arizona.
He also admitted to owning the snort bottle that contained residue of methamphetamine,
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which was found in his pants.

The only other evidence presented with respect to

Rothlisberger was that he was the passenger in the vehicle Althoff was driving, which
vehicle contained methampetamine and drug paraphernalia in the form of scales and baggies
that Althoff claimed in their entirety as her own. Based on this minimal evidence, a jury
convicted Rothlisberger of the second degree felony of possession with intent to distribute.
To come to this type of conclusion based on the minimal evidence, the jury had to
indulge an inference upon an inference, or inference upon assumption, that could lead but
to conjecture. An inference is defined as "[a] process of reasoning by which a fact or
proposition sought to be established is deduced as a logical consequence from other facts,
or a state of facts, already proved or admitted." Black's Law Dictionary, Abridged 5th Ed.,
p. 398, "Inference." The evidence that Rothlisberger used methamphetamine earlier that day
and that he possessed a snort bottle containing residue of the drug are not facts that logically
lead a reasonable mind to the conclusion that Rothlisberger intended to distribute the
methamphetamine. For this reason, to say that the jury indulged in inference upon inference
is in itself somewhat farreaching.
To assume is to pretend. Black's Law Dictionary, Abridged 5th Ed., p. 63, "Assume."
It is more likely that the jury assumed that Rothlisberger had the necessary intent to obtain
and use the methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia since no evidence was ever presented
with respect to this intent. This Court cautioned courts to take special care to ensure that
their review of the evidence did not encourage the indulging of "inference upon inference,"
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or, worse, the indulging of inference upon assumption. State v. Lavman. 953 P.2d 782,791
(Utah App.,1998) citing State v. George. 481 P.2d 667 (Utah 1971); see also State v.
Franks. 649 P.2d 3, 4 (Utah 1982). Based on the jury's assumption, Rothlisberger was
convicted of a crime the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt and his conviction
should be overturned.
F.

The State must prove case beyond a reasonable doubt.

The State carries the burden in criminal cases of proving each element of the charged
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In cases relying on constructive possession, that burden
entails a presentation of extensive and detailed facts. Layman citing Anderton 668 P.2d at
1263. Lack of such evidence may well make it impossible for the State to fulfill its duty to
establish— beyond a reasonable doubt—the necessary nexus between a defendant and the
contraband; any significant deficiency in evidence establishing the nexus almost always
leaves room for those "reasonable hypothesfes] of innocence" which "necessarily raise[ ] a
reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt." Layman citing Hill 727 P.2d at 222 (citation
omitted).
Neither possibilities nor probabilities can substitute for certainty beyond a reasonable
doubt. Lavman citing State v. Murphv. 617 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah 1980) ("[Criminal
convictions may not be based upon conjectures or probabilities and before we can uphold a
conviction it must be supported by a quantum of evidence concerning each element of the
crime as chargedfromwhich the jury may base its conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable
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doubt"); see also Zertuche v. State. 774 S.W.2d 697, 701 (Tex.Ct.App.l989)("[S]trong
suspicions or mere probabilities are not sufficient.").
As argued above, the jury indulged in assumptions which led simply to conjecture.
No extensive or detailed facts were presented at trial to sufficiently establish the nexus
between Rothlisberger and the methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia, particularly for a
conviction of the second degree felony of possession with intent to distribute. In failing to
establish this necessary nexus, the reasonable hypothesis ofRothlisberger's innocence cannot
be ignored. Althoff laid claim to the methamphetamine and the drug paraphernalia and
absolutely no evidence was presented countering her testimony. The State failed to prove
its case beyond a reasonable doubt.
G.

The Jury cannot discredit Tonya's testimony and replace it with its belief
as to truth of evidence not in the record.

Although the jury may reject Althoff s testimony as not credible, this Court has stated
that it cannot substitute its belief as to the truth of evidence not in the record. State v.
Layman, 953 P.2d 782, 790 (Utah App.,1998). Althoff laid claim to the large quantity of
methamphetamine and the paraphernalia found in the car by the police officers. At trial, the
State attempted to discredit her testimony as simply trying to protect Rothlisberger; however,
no evidence was presented to show that Rothlisberger had knowledge of its existence, nor
that he had possession or control over it or even intended to possess or control it. Without
any evidence in the record, the jury, after discrediting Althoff s testimony, substituted its
belief as to the truth of evidence not in the record. This Court has reversed in prior cases
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where juries have participated in this type of misguided practice, and it should do so here.
See, State v. Layman. 953 P.2d 782, 790 (Utah App., 1998).
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S OBJECTION TO THE PROSECUTOR'S
MISSTATEMENT OF LAW IN HIS CLOSING
In determining whether a given statement constitutes prosecutorial misconduct, this
Court must view the statement in light of the totality of the evidence presented at trial;
further, because the trial court is in the best position to determine the impact of a statement
upon the proceedings, its rulings will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. State
v. Longshaw. 961 P.2d 925 (Utah App. 1998). This Court has enunciated a two-part test
whereby it will reverse on the basis ofprosecutorial misconduct only if defendant shows that
[ 1 ] "the actions or remarks of [prosecuting] counsel call to the attention of the jury a matter
it would not be justified in considering in determining its verdict and, if so, [2] under the
circumstances of the particular case, whether the error is substantial and prejudicial such that
there is a reasonable likelihood that, in its absence, there would have been a more favorable
result...." Id. at 928, citing State v. Cummins. 839 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah App. 1992) {quoting
State v.Peters. 796 P.2d 708,712 (Utah App. 1990)), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993).
Accord State v. Span. 819 P.2d 329,335 (Utah 1991); State v. Bovatt. 854 P.2d 550, 554-55
(Utah App.), cert, denied, 862 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993).
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A.

The Prosecutor's Misstatement of Law Called to the Attention of the Jury
a Matter it Would Not Be Justified in Considering in Determining its
Verdict.

Conviction of possession with intent to distribute requires proof of two elements: (1)
that defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed a controlled substance, and (2) that
defendant intended to distribute the controlled substance to another. State v. Fox. 709 P.2d
316, 318 (Utah 1985) (citing UTAH CODE ANN. §58-37-8(l)(a)(ii)). Possession of a
controlled substance sufficient to sustain a conviction need not be actual but may be
constructive. State v. Bingham. 732 P.2d 132, 133 (Utah 1987). In cases involving joint
occupancy of a place where contraband is found, mere control or dominion over the place
in which the contraband is found is not enough to establish constructive possession. U.S. v.
McKissick. 204 F.3d 1282 (C.A.10 (Okla.),2000) citing United States v. Mills. 29 F.3d 545,
549 (10th Cir. 1994). "Evidence supporting the theory of 'constructive possession' mustraise
a reasonable inference that the defendant was engaging in a criminal enterprise and not
simply a bystander." State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 320 (Utah 1985).
In order to prove constructive possession, there must be a nexus between the accused
and the drug sufficient enough to allow an inference that the accused had both the ability and
the intent to exercise dominion and control over the drug. State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319
(Utah 1985): see also State v. Bingham, 732 P.2d 132,133 (Utah 1987): State v. Hansen, 732
P.2d 127, 131 (Utah 1987). A sufficient nexus is not established by mere "[o]wnership
and/or occupancy of the premises upon which the drugs [were] found ... especially when
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occupancy is not exclusive." Statev.Salas. 820P.2d 1386 (Utah App. 1991)c#mgFox,709
P.2d at 319. This general rule supports the assertion that "the mere presence of the defendant
in an automobile in which illicit drugs are found does not, without more, constitute sufficient
proof of his possession of such drugs..." Id. citing Annotation, Conviction of Possession of
Illicit Drugs Found in Automobile of Which Defendant Was Not Sole Occupant, 57 A.L.RJd
1319,1326 (1974). In order to find that the accused was in possession of drugs found in an
automobile he was not the sole occupant of, and did not have sole access to, there must be
other evidence to buttress such an inference.
Mere knowledge, without more, on the part of one automobile passenger that a copassenger is carrying illicit drugs does not constitute the former a co-possessor. State v.
Layman, 953 P.2d 782,791 (Utah App. 1998) citing State v. Shipp. 524 A.2d 864,866 (N.J.
Super. A.D. 1987). Knowledge and ability to possess do not equal possession where there
is no evidence of intent to make use of that knowledge and ability. State v. Fox. 709 P.2d
316,319 (Utah 1985). Persons who might know of the whereabouts of illicit drugs and who
might even have access to them, but who have no intent to obtain and use the drugs cannot
be convicted of possession. Id.
Presence and proximity are inadequate to support a conviction for possession of a
controlled substance. U.S. v. Valadez-Gallegos, 162 F.3d 1256 (10th Cir.(N.M.),1998).
Evidence of prior use by the defendant does not in itself support a finding of knowledge,
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ability and intent to exercise dominion and control over drugs. State v. Lavman. 953 P.2d
782, 789 (Utah App. 1998).
At the conclusion of the trial in the instant case, the prosecutor presented his closing
arguments to the jury (Tr. at pp. 143-158). The colloquy at issue here is as follows:
[MR. HALLS]: If I drive the car with people with drugs in it and I know the
drugs are in there, Fm guilty of possession, the same as they.
MS. REILLY: Objection, your Honor, that's a misstatement of the law.
MR. HALLS: What's the objection?
THE COURT: It's a misstatement of law.
MS. REILLY: If the Court doesn't me to argue it, then I'll come up and say
that (inaudible).
MR. HALLS: I thought I was making a point about what aiding somebody is.
I don't think I misstated that.
MS. REILLY: Simply being in a car where another person has drugs doesn't
make everybody in the car guilty of that. That's a misstatement, unless they
just have to have (inaudible).
THE COURT: I thought he said driving the car.
MR. HALLS: I said if they were driving the car and they knew the drugs were
in there — I'm setting forth the proposition that that's aiding or (inaudible).
THE COURT: I think driving the car can make (inaudible). Objection
overruled.
MR. HALLS: "A person who encourages or aids another person to engage in
conduct which constitutes an offense is criminally liable (inaudible) for the
same conduct." That's your instruction No. 7.
Your instruction No. 6 says something kind of similar. It's not required
that a person be shown to have individually possessed or used a controlled
substance. The substance - but it is sufficient if it is shown that the person
jointly participated with one or more persons in the use, possession or control."
That's called accomplice liability.
That means if he knew, and you have many indications that he knew it
was there, even though she's taking credit for it, you don't have to believe that
that was the truth when she yells out, "That's just mine."
You can find that he knew it was there. If you do, ladies and
gentlemen, you can find Mr. Rothlisberger guilty of possession with intent to
distribute. You can find her guilty of the same thing. I think you can do that
without having to resort to either one of these instructions.
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But if you, if that doesn't make you comfortable, then you should say,
"Well, but if he aided and assisted her or knew that she was doing this, or he
knew she was participating in this," you can still find him guilty under that
theory.
(Tr. at pp. 151-152).
The prosecutorfirstmisstated the law when he set forth that "[i]f I drive the car with
people with drugs in it and I know the drugs are in there, I'm guilty of possession, the same
as they." (Tr. at p. 151). A sufficient nexus between the accused and the drug to prove
constructive possession is not established by mere "[o]wnership and/or occupancy of the
premises upon which the drugs [were] found... especially when occupancy is not exclusive."
Statev.Salas. 820P.2d 1386(UtahApp. 1991)citingVm, 709P.2dat319. Additionally,
mere knowledge, without more, on the part of one automobile passenger that a co-passenger
is carrying illicit drugs does not constitute the former a co-possessor. State v. Layman. 953
P.2d 782,791 (Utah App. 1998) citing State v. Shipp. 524 A.2d 864, 866 (N.J. Super. A.D.
1987). The prosecutor's statement led the jury to believe that, if a person drives a car with
drugs in it and they know the drugs are there, then they are guilty of possession. The
prosecutor obviously misstated the law and brought to the attention of the jury a matter it
would not be justified in considering in determining its verdict.
The next misstatement of the law occurred when the prosecutor informed the jury,
with respect to Jury Instruction No. 6, that if they could find that Rothlisberger knew the
drugs were in the car, then they couldfindhim guilty of possession with intent to distribute
(Tr. at p. 152). Conviction of possession with intent to distribute requires proof of two
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elements: (1) that defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed a controlled substance,
and (2) that defendant intended to distribute the controlled substance to another. State v. Fox.
709 P.2d 316, 318 (Utah 1985) {citing UTAH

CODE ANN.

§58-37-8(l)(a)(ii)). The

prosecutor's misstatement of the law here led the jury to believe that all they needed to find
was that Rothlisberger had knowledge that the drug was there and they couldfindhim guilty
of possession with intent to distribute. The law clearly states that mere knowledge, without
more, on the part of one automobile passenger that a co-passenger is carrying illicit drugs
does not constitute the former a co-possessor. State v. Layman. 953 P.2d 782, 791 (Utah
App. 1998) citing State v. Shipp. 524 A.2d 864, 866 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1987). Not only is
knowledge insufficient to a showing of possession, but it is extremely farreaching to state
that it is sufficient to show possession with intent to distribute. The prosecutor obviously
misstated the law and brought to the attention of the jury a matter it would not be justified
in considering in determining its verdict.
Although the prosecutor's statement seems focused on the "driver" of the vehicle, the
prosecutor intended the statement to also go to Appellant's occupancy of the premises. As
the prosecutor explained, he was attempting to set up a theory of "aiding." (Tr. at p. 152).
Later in his closing arguments, the prosecutor stated that, if the jury doesn't feel comfortable
finding Appellant guilty of possession with intent to distribute, then they can still find him
guilty by aiding and assisting Althoff under the theory created by his misstatement of the law
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(Tr. at p. 153). It is clear that the prosecutor misstated the law and intended for it to pertain
to Appellant's involvement in the matter.
B.

The Error Was Substantial and Prejudicial Such That There Is a
Reasonable Likelihood That, in its Absence, There Would Have Been a
More Favorable Result.

This Court will reverse on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct if defendant shows
that [1] "the actions or remarks of [prosecuting] counsel call to the attention of the jury a
matter it would not be justified in considering in determining its verdict and, if so, [2] under
the circumstances of the particular case, whether the error is substantial and prejudicial such
that there is a reasonable likelihood that, in its absence, there would have been a more
favorable result..." Id. at 928, citing State v. Cummins. 839 P.2d 848,852 (Utah App. 1992)
(quoting State v. Peters. 796 P.2d 708, 712 (Utah App. 1990)), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897
(Utah 1993\^ccor^Statev. Span. 819P.2d329,335 (Utah 1991): State v. Bovatt. 854P.2d
550,554-55 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 862 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993). The second prong of the
prosecutorial misconduct test requires "consideration of the circumstances of the case as a
whole. In making such a consideration, it is appropriate to look at the evidence of defendant's
guilt." State v.Trov. 688 P.2d 483,486 (Utah 1984). Accord State v. Finlavson. 956 P.2d 283
(Utah Ct.App. 1998). Thus," '[i]f proof of defendant's guilt is strong, the challenged conduct
or remark will not be presumed prejudicial* Likewise, in a case with less compelling proof,
[an appellate court] will more closely scrutinize the conduct." Trov. 688 P.2d at 486 {quoting
State v. Seeeer. 4 Or.App. 336,479 P.2d 240,241 (1971)). If the conclusion of the jurors
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is based on their weighing conflicting evidence or evidence susceptible of differing
interpretations, there is a greater likelihood that they will be improperly influenced through
remarks of counsel. Troy, 688 P.2d at 486.
As argued above under Argument "II," the evidence was sufficiently lacking for a
determination that Rothlisberger was guilty of possession or possession with intent to
distribute. Thus, a more closely scrutinized analysis of the prosecutor's misstatements of the
law is warranted. A review of the evidence in this case, when coupled with the prosecutor's
misstatements of the law, clearly show that the error was prejudicial and there is a reasonable
likelihood that, in its absence, there would have been a more favorable result.
The conclusions drawn by the jury in this matter were based upon circumstantial
evidence, which is not based in actual personal knowledge or observation of the facts in
controversy, but on other facts from which deductions are drawn. Black's Law Dictionary,
Abridged 5th Ed., p. 126, "circumstantial evidence." The simple fact that the evidence is
circumstantial in the instant matter induces susceptibility to differing interpretations. As
argued supra, circumstantial evidence presented must sufficiently exclude reasonable
alternative hypotheses of innocence. State v. Lavman. 953 P.2d 782,790 (Utah App. 1998);
Cf. State v.Shipp. 216 N.J.Super. 662, 524 A.2d 864, 866 (App.Div.1987).
The circumstantial evidence of the instant case is no more consistent with the
proposition that Appellant planned to distribute this quantity of methamphetamine than it is
that he did not. This less than extensive and detailed evidence does not sufficiently exclude
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the alternative hypothesis that Appellant (a) did not know the toilet paper roll4 or the scales
and baggies5 were even in the vehicle and (b) was nervous only because the pants which
contained the snort bottle to which Appellant claimed ownership were located in this same
vicinity of the vehicle as the toilet paper roll—namely, thefrontpassenger side. Appellant's
nervousness is just as easily explained by the idea that he was concerned about the officers
discovering the snort bottle in the pants.
With less than compelling evidence, the jury was improperly influenced by the
prosecutor's misstatements of the law. Hypothetically, if the jury had only been able to find
with the evidence presented that Rothlisberger had knowledge that the drugs were in the
vehicle, the prosecutor's misstatement would have led them to believe that finding the
requisite nexus was completely unnecessary. The jury was inappropriately led to believe that
they simply had to find that Rothlisberger had knowledge to find him guilty, not only of
constructive possession, but of possession with intent to distribute.
The prosecutor's misstatements of the law brought matters to the attention of the jury
that it would not be justified in considering in determining its verdict. Because these matters

4

Adair testified that Rothlisberger told him to pull the pants out of the door if they
were in the way (Tr. at p. 97). If Rothlisberger had actual knowledge that the toilet paper
roll was in the door panel, he naturally would have been at least a little reluctant in
allowing Adair to remove the pants; however, Adair's testimony did not indicate any
reluctance on Rothlisberger's part.
5

It is important to reiterate that the scales and baggies were found concealed in
Althoff s gym bag in the backseat of the vehicle, and no evidence was presented
indicating that Rothlisberger had any knowledge they were there.
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were brought to the attention of the jury, the inadequate evidence presented by the State was
inappropriately considered adequate for a finding of possession and possession with intent
to distribute. As argued supra, the evidence was insufficient to find Rothlisberger guilty of
possession or possession with intent to distribute. Because the misstatements made by the
prosecutor went directly towards the findings, it is likely that this matter would have bom a
different outcome absent those statements. Because the misstatements were allowed by the
trial court, Rothlisberger was denied his right to a fair trial and the Judgment should be
reversed. UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, Amend. VI and XIV; UTAH CONSTITUTION, Art.
1 §7.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests that this
Court reverse the trial court's Judgment.
DATED this f j

Hay of ^ 6 j ^ T :

, 2003.

Barton J.^arreii
f~
Attorney for Thomas Kevin Rothlisberger
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postage prepaid, true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to:
J. Frederic Voros, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
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Addendum ~A~
Judgment and Order ofProbation,
dated May 21, 2003

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
San Juan County
BLEO

HAY 2 1 2003
CLERK OF THE COURT

3Y„

iwjan...
DEPUTY

\J
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
OF PROBATION

Plaintiff,
vs.
THOMAS KEVIN ROTHLISBERGER,

COURT CASE NO: 0217-83

Defendant.
MAY 5, 2003
HONORABLE LYLE R. ANDERSON
Plaintiff Attorney:

Craig C. Halls

Defendant Attorney:

Barton J. Warren

DEFENDANT, THOMAS KEVIN ROTHLISBERGER, having heretofore
been found guilty of the following offenses:
COUNT 1: POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO
DISTRIBUTE, a Second Degree Felony, and COUNT 2: POSSESSION OF
DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, A Class B Misdemeanor, and no legal reason
having been shown why judgment of this court should not be
pronounced, it is the judgment of this court as follows:
That the Defendant be imprisoned in the Utah State Prison
for a term of ONE (1) TO FIFTEEN (15) YEARS and SIX (6) MONTHS on
Count 2 and pay a fine in the amount of $925.00 plus interest.

The prison sentence is stayed and Defendant is placed on
probation with Adult Probation and Parole for a period of 3 6
months upon the following conditions:
1.

That the defendant enter into an agreement with the

Department of Corrections, Adult Probation and Parole and comply
strictly with its terms and conditions.
2.

That the defendant serve 12 months in the San Juan

County Jail, receiving credit for time served.
3.

That the defendant enter into and successfully complete

any substance abuse/mental health treatment as directed by Adult
Probation and Parole at his own expense.
4.

Submit to Utah State Statute 53-10-405.5 and allow the

Utah Department of Corrections to obtain DNA specimens from the
defendant and pay for the costs associated with obtaining the DNA
specimens.
5.

That the defendant not associate with co-defendant Tonya

Althoff.
6.

That the defendant not associate with persons known to

use, distribute or possess illegal/controlled substances or those
arrested previously for drug offenses.
7.

That the defendant be required to place a sign on the

front door of residence indicating that he is on probation and

anyone entering the residence is subject to search.

That the

sign not be removed without the consent of the court or Adult
Probation and Parole.
8,

That the defendant report to the Department and to the

Court whenever required.
9.

That the defendant violate no law, either Federal, State

or Municipal.
The Court retains jurisdiction to make such other and
further orders as it may deem necessary from time to time.

DATED thisiR>jyS3^^ay, of May, 2003

f

m^dS^4

'Anderson
.strict Court Judge
flails*
County Attorney
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the £ V day of May, 2003, I mailed,
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the above JUDGMENT
AND ORDER to Barton J. Warren, Attorney for Defendant, 261 East
300 South, Suite 175, Salt Lake City, UT 84111. ^ ft r* *

Clerk
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